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Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes. Robert C. Ellickson. 
Harvard University Press. 1991. $39.95.1 
Robert Ellickson has written an interesting and challenging book on the role of 
informal cooperation which offers a basis for interdisciplinary dialogue among 
lawyers, economists, policy scientists, political theorists and researchers interested 
in community and organizational phenomena. Informal cooperation, in the sense 
that he uses the idea, is guided not by formal laws and regulations but rather by 
social norms and social institutions. Such cooperation is fundamental to voluntary 
action. 
The first seven chapters are a paradigm of good social science theorizing. The 
author introduces an important theoretical issue--in this case, the Coase "Social 
Cost" Theorem--and a detailed case example upon which to evaluate the issue. 
Coase uses the parable of the Farmer and the Rancher to argue the counter-
intuitive proposition that when transaction costs are zero, a change in the rule of 
liability will have no effect on the allocation of resources. Among legal scholars, the 
theorem is a hot potato in the contesting between the "law-and-economics" and 
"law-and-society" factions of legal theorists. What is at stake, however, goes well 
beyond those local debates, and has major implications and possibilities for 
informing future research on nonprofit organizations, voluntary action and 
philanthropy. 
Ellickson chooses a clever and highly appropriate real-life example, involving 
"ranchers" and "farmers" in the northwest sector of Shasta County in Northern 
California, a checkerboard of open and closed ranges, fences, roving cattle, and 
remarkably uninvolved lawyers and law enforcement agencies. Shasta Countians 
have developed a complex culture of cooperation with rules for retrieving stray 
cattle, constructing and repairing fences, assigning compensation for damages, and 
other relevant norms. In Ellickson’s account, all of this occurs counter to Coase-
predictions and almost completely without resort to the law. 
Ellickson’s study reaches well beyond its modestly limited presentation in terms 
of the legal debate between the law-and-economics and law-and-society views. His is 
a full-blown rational-choice model of cooperation, built up not from the usual arid 
logic of the armchair theorists but from a challenging real-life example including 
full measure of "psychological" and "social" elements like custom, envy, gossip, 
ritual and hero-worship. Here is Hardin’s tragic commons in the guise of a cowboy 
western not unlike the plot of the Broadway musical Oklahoma: California range 
not descending into a Hobbesian war of each against all, nor rescued by the long 
 
1 A revised and edited version of this review was published in Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly. 
22.3. (Fall, 1993). 271-273.)  
arm of the law, but rather bound tightly together by the informal ("voluntary", that 
is, uncoerced) cooperation of neighbors.  
NVSQ readers who may be weary (or wary) of the artificiality of this style of 
academic discourse and suspicious of the mathematical pyrotechnics which often 
accompany it should take heart. Ellickson is no ideologue, and not out to prove his 
mathematical prowess. His feet are planted squarely in the reality of the Shasta 
County example (with a few enlightening digressions into the whaling industry, the 
photocopying practices of professors and other strange customs). Ellickson 
interprets many of the cattle practices of Shasta county with the aid of game theory 
and his mathematics don’t stray beyond ordinary algebra. In particular, he follows 
up on Robert Axelrod’s "Tit-for-Tat" cooperative solution to the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
with his own interesting "Specialized Labor" game to account, among other things, 
for the asymmetric fence-building division of labor among ranchers and their 
(typically five-acre) ranchettes.  
So why should scholars interested in nonprofit organizations, voluntary action 
and philanthropy be interested at all in the Ellickson world of Shasta County? For a 
number of reasons, both negative and positive: Negatively, it portrays a social world 
without a Third Sector. Cooperation is only among individual property owners. 
Although the Shasta County farmers (like American farmers everywhere) are prone 
to organize a series of political and self-help associations for petition drives, cattle 
retrieval and other forms of community action, these do not figure into the analysis 
or theory in any way.  
Also, the social world of Shasta County is portrayed as a nearly picture-perfect 
Hobbes-Locke world of atomistic (Anglo male) individuals who live on a small set of  
traditional ranches and their equally atomistic (equally Anglo, equally male) 
neighbors who have moved into the community recently to live on "ranchettes". The 
historical backdrop for the case study is the familiar one of male ranchers who 
carved civilization out of the apparently empty wilderness, reclaiming the land from 
a state of nature with no apparent ecological consequences, and the apparently 
complete cooperation of the prior residents (whether Amerindian or Hispanic.) Some 
ranchers appear to have families, but, unbelievably, family members other than the 
"owners" (pater familias) have no recorded impact upon the law, property or 
informal social order of Shasta county. Fathers never send their kids or wives to 
retrieve the cows, and the race, religion, and other factors which influence and 
condition cooperation in other contexts never enter in. At least one rancher is 
"college educated" which seems to increase his cooperation at least to a degree, but 
any theoretical implications are lost or ignored. 
The rational ranchers of Shasta County are also never portrayed in their full 
complexity as citizens, friends and neighbors and consequently, the full implications 
for the theory of their choice to be welfare-maximizing in these circumstances (along 
with the equally rational choices to be income-maximizing and for the affluent to 
forego maximization altogether) are not explored.  
At a general level of the guiding theoretical model, Ellickson’s terminology 
reduces the complex interactions of self, other and community to a set of slightly 
jarring legalisms: "first party control(actor)" and "second party control (person acted 
upon)". However, these labeling inadequacies are offset by the detailed discussions 
which follow. There are also certain definitional problems: A fence between two 
properties is defined as a "public good", yet the public good aspects (e.g., protection 
of the community at large from cattle contained by the fence) are not explored. The 
discussion concentrates exclusively on the "common goods" implications for the 
diads of farmer-neighbors actually separated by any particular fence. 
Cooperation in the Ellickson-world of Shasta County does not contain a third 
sector or commons, or indeed, any space between the purely public realm of public 
law and the private world of the individual landholder’s actions: There is no sharing 
of purposes or resources, and a sense of mutuality is variable, although voluntary 
cooperation and indigenous norms of justice are clearly evident. The entire non-
governmental social world of families, markets and religious, political, social and 
other commons is reduced to Ellickson’s own variant on three sectors: "social forces 
(norms)", "organizations (rules)" and "government (law)." There is only one very 
brief (and inconclusive) reference to "charity". This seems more a bow to past 
preoccupation with charity issues in the rational choice literature than to any 
relevance to the overall argument for his theory.  
Even so, there is much to be admired here: Ellickson develops his legal analysis 
from a complete, real-life case study rather than a set of cardboard cut-out "rational 
economic" strawmen. Understandings of the role of cooperation in nonprofit 
organizations, voluntary action and philanthropy would benefit from close study of 
both the findings and the methodology employed here. 
• All those who hope to find solutions to social problems in the adoption of 
particular laws or "policies" would do well to study Ellickson (and Axelrod) 
more closely: In the real world of Shasta County, people don’t ever appear to 
solve their problems through first-order resort to law or policy. Their first 
choice is typically resort to informal cooperation and voluntary action. 
Further, social policies which embody sanctions typically employ them after 
the manner of a single round Tit-For-Tat game, while the problem itself may 
be a multi-round game. 
• Most important of all for readers of this journal are the implications of 
Ellickson’s theory of cooperation for the study of nonprofit organizations. 
Organizations are ordinarily created to be "systems of cooperation" in the 
words of Chester Barnard’s pioneering theory of organization, but the 
descriptive literature documents a vast and sorry history of departures from 
that norm. The problems of programs and policies, oligarchic leadership, 
bureaucratic empire building and programmatic "turf" all seem strangely 
analogous to the cooperation over fences and wandering cows of Shasta 
County. 
 
